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The sight of an animal making and using a tool captivates
scientists and laymen alike, perhaps because it forces us
to question some of our ideas about human uniqueness.
Does the animal knowhow the tool works?Did it anticipate
the need for the tool andmake it in advance? To some, this
fascination with tools seems arbitrary and anthropocen-
tric; after all, animals engage in many other complex activ-
ities, like nest building, and we know that complex behav-
iour need not be cognitively demanding. But tool-using
behaviour can also provide a powerful window into the
minds of living animals, and help us to learn what capac-
ities we share with them — and what might have changed
to allow for the incontrovertibly unique levels of tech-
nology shown by modern humans.
The notion of ‘man the tool maker’, that we alone in the
animal kingdom manufacture and use tools, has long been
known to be false. The first blow was struck by chimpan-
zees, which Jane Goodall famously described fashioning
tools to fish for termites [1]. Since then the flood-gates
have opened. Chimpanzee technology has received the
most attention and is wide-ranging: for example, they use
stone tools to crack open hard nuts, strong sticks to dig in
the ground for tubers and underground bee hives, and
sharpened sticks to spear bush babies sleeping in tree holes
(for a recent overview see [2]). Perhaps unsurprisingly
primates stand out among mammals as the most frequent
tool-users. Like chimpanzees, capuchin monkeys use
stones both for nut cracking and digging [3]. Tools can
extend the reach of the senses as well as the grasp: gorillas,
when wading through water, use stick tools to test its depth.
Acts of communication can also be enhanced by tools:
orangutans use a handful of leaves to deepen the pitch of
one of their calls. Tools can be protective: a chimpanzee
may use a stick to investigate a fire (Figure 1), and orangu-
tans use small sticks to rid Neesia fruits of their irritant hairs
when extracting the seeds inside. And protection can also
be important when catching prey, as when chimpanzees
dip with long sticks for ferocious driver ants marching along
the forest floor. Dolphins in Shark Bay carry sponges over
their rostrums when foraging on the ocean floor, perhaps
for a similar reason (Figure 2) [4].
Such remarkable behaviour is not the sole preserve of
primates or even mammals: some of the most impressive
non-human tools are made by New Caledonian crows, a
member of the Corvidea, a large-brained family of birds.
New Caledonian crows extract grubs from tree holes using
two distinct kinds of tool [5]. One variety is cut from the
leaves of Pandanus (Figure 3). The other variety is made
from twigs by removing all side branches from the central
stem except one at the distal end, which is instead cut
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A case of tool-use seems intuitively easy to identify, but
a suitably precise definition has actually proved hard to pin
down because of the problem of borderline cases. For
instance, a widely-used definition is the use of an object
‘‘to alter. the form, position, or condition of another object,
another organism, or the user itself when the user holds
or carries the tool during or just prior to use’’ [6]. Several
species (chimpanzees, capuchin monkeys and elephants)
use branches or leaves to rid themselves of flies or parasites;
but some chimpanzees use a vine for this purpose. The vine
is not a detached object and would not ‘count’ as a tool, but
is there a meaningful difference? Yet if we admit the vine,
then perhaps the use of a scratching post by a cow or horse
should count, and tool-use starts to bleed into any behaviour
involving the external environment (for example, climbing
a tree or building a nest). Water is another slippery case, as
revealed by a problem-solving task given to orangutans
and later to rooks. In both studies, a food reward was placed
at the bottom of a transparent tube, out of reach of the
subject, floating in a small volume of water [7]. Orangutans
brought the food within reach by spitting more water into
the tube, while rooks added stones, raising the level of the
water until they could reach the reward with their beaks [8].
Were the rooks displaying tool use but the orangutans not?
Archer fish, which spit jets of water to dislodge insects
from the vegetation above them, are not usually considered
tool-users. Nor are birds, such as seagulls and ravens, that
drop encased food (shellfish, nuts, eggs or bones) from
a height onto a hard surface to crack them open; but is this
really different from capuchin monkeys or chimpanzees
throwing sticks and stones, or using stones to smash open
nuts [9]?
Despite the seemingly arbitrary nature of the distinction,
using a tool as an extension of the bodymay have particular
consequences for psychological processes such as percep-
tion, attention and cognition, because the periphery of
the body is thereby changed in mechanical and sensory
capabilities. Recent research suggests that, in humans and
monkeys, this extended motor capability is followed by
changes in specific neural networks that hold an updated
map of body shape and posture [10]. As such, the classic
definition retains its usefulness. Some borderline cases,
such as sea otters smashing shellfish on a hard surface, are
sometimes referred to as ‘proto-tool-use’: this identifies
potentially interesting behaviour in which an outcome is
achieved via a secondary object or substance, albeit not
something defined as a tool. (And the usefulness of this
distinction is reinforced by finding that, among birds, ‘true’
tool-users have larger brains relative to their bodies than
proto-tool-users [9].) For the comparative psychologist, the
semantics of which behaviour should ‘count’ seems less
important than finding candidate cases of an animal solving
a problem for which evolution has not provided a rigid
morphological or behavioural adaptation: a context in which
general cognitive abilities, like learning and reasoning, may
be recruited.Tools and Cognition
Human tool-making is characterized by an understanding of
the physics of our bodies and surrounding objects, and an
Figure 1. A chimpanzee uses a stem to poke a small fire.
Lit by a person, a small grass fire interests but frightens a rehabilitant
chimpanzee, whose first reaction is to use a tool for investigation.
(Photo: Richard Byrne.)
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a distal goal. Tool-use can result from far simpler mecha-
nisms, such as inborn dispositions and trial and error
learning [11]: but can all animal tool-use be explained in
that way? Or do we see the evolutionary roots of human
cognition in animal tool use?
Causality
We can recognize an animal’s target outcome: when it
pursues that outcome directly, and ceases to act when it
has been achieved. But does that mean that the animal has
an internal representation of the goal ‘in mind’, and knows
that its actions will cause it to follow? The difficulty is
captured by two examples. Baboons throw rocks at preda-
tors, with the result that the predator is deterred. Do baboons
recognize that being pelted with stones would cause the
predator to flee, and throw them with that intention? With
a primate, the tendency is to assume that the answer is
yes, based on their large brains and their close relationship
to humans. But what about the ant-lion larva, which flicks
grains of sand at prey on the edge of its trap, causing them
to fall in? Our intuition is that this behaviour, despite its
surface similarities, has a different underlying cognitive
mechanism: but does it? An isolated observation of tool-
using behaviour cannot tell us much about the animals’
appreciation of the underlying causality.
A case for goal-directedness has beenmade for laboratory
rats by training a pair of instrumental actions, such as chain-
pulling for one food type and lever-pressing for another.
When one food was devalued, for example by pre-feeding
it to the rats, they homed in on the action that produced
the other food: their action was therefore not triggered
simply by force of habit, but by the context in which they
were previously rewarded. Similarly, if the food linked to
one action began to appear just as often when the rat per-
formed the action as when it did not, the rats gave up that
action but continued to perform the other; but if the delivery
of ‘free’, non-contingent foodwas preceded by a signal, both
actions continued to be performed. The rats’ actions satisfy
the criteria for goal-directedness: sensitivity to the incentive
value of the rewards on offer and the causal relationship
between their actions and their specific outcomes [12].
In other words, rats represent what they want and what
they have to do to get it.
If the behaviour of the ant-lion larva is hard-wired or
habitual rather than goal-directed, wewould expect the larva
to behave differently to the rats: it might continue flicking
sand at insects appearing at the edge of its trap even if
they had become inedible, or if the contingency between
flicking sand and insects falling was disrupted. That would
suggest that tool-use in this species is inflexible and non-
selective; unfortunately, these sorts of experimental manipu-
lations are difficult to carry out in natural settings and have
seldom been done. The tool-use of chimpanzees, capuchin
monkeys and New Caledonian crows, at least, displays the
hallmarks of goal directedness: selectivity, choosing or
tailoring the tool to suit the specific goal at hand, and flexi-
bility, such as using several means to achieve the same
end [13,14]. But there is an inborn component to the tool-
using behaviour of even these accomplished and relatively
large-brained tool-users. They begin manipulating tool
objects (sticks or stones) from a young age, even in the
absence of a goal object [15,16]; and, despite the impressive
ability of New Caledonian crows to use up to three tools insequence in laboratory experiments (using smaller tools to
gain tools long enough to reach a reward), they will some-
times use small tools to fish for longer ones when there is
no ultimate food reward present [17]. Goal-directedness is
not a simple all-or-nothing issue.
Physical Reasoning
A special case of causal reasoning concerns the physical
process by which a tool effects its outcome. Even a goal-
directed tool-user might know that her action caused an
outcome, without knowing how or why it worked; in fact
this is how the less technologically-minded among us use
sophisticated tools like laser pointers or microphones. But
humans are also capable of physical reasoning, for example
unbending a coat-hanger to fish for keys that have fallen out-
of-reach: fashioning a tool with the right physical properties
to solve a problem. Betty the New Caledonian crow showed
the same creative modification in the laboratory, bending
(and unbending) wire to make a suitable hook or probing
tool [18]. Selective tool modification is also seen in primates
(Figure 4): Gombe chimpanzees, for instance, famously
convert a leafy vine into a thin, flexible probe-tool for
Figure 2. A dolphin ‘sponging’.
It is thought that dolphins at Shark Bay,
Australia, have developed a tradition of using
sponges to protect their sensitive rostrums
when foraging on abrasive parts of the sea
floor. (Photo: Michael Kruetzen.)
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Behaviour like this raises the intriguing possibility that the
animals represent the physical properties and forces
involved in the tool-using event in an abstract, conceptual
way: in terms of properties such as rigidity, continuity, and
connectedness. The simpler alternative is that the animals’
thinking is grounded in perceptual features of the objects
(their shape, feel, or spatial orientation). Psychological
experiments have often capitalized on tool-using (or proto-
tool-using) behaviour to try to tease these alternative expla-
nations apart.
For many years, laboratory studies gave results support-
ing the simpler explanation. Even chimpanzees seemed to
be using perceptually-based information rather than an
abstract notion of object properties [19]; for example, in
the ‘trap-tube’ task, in which the subject needs to push
a piece of food out of a horizontal tube away from a trap,
the one chimpanzee that learned to do so continued to use
this strategy even when the tube was inverted and the trap
was non-functional. A capuchin monkey that solved the
trap-tube task did likewise [20], as did a New Caledonian
crow [21]. It seemed that even these successful individuals
had avoided the trap as a perceptual feature but had not en-
coded its functional significance. Similarly, although chim-
panzees would choose a complete tool over a broken one
when the break in the wrong tool was clearly visible, they
chose indiscriminately if the ends of the broken tool were
aligned in front of them [19]. NewCaledonian crows, required
to make a tool to fish for food in transparent wells, first made
a tool of intermediate length and only made a longer one if
the first one was too short [22]. When presented with a tool
made frombarbedPandanus leaves, positioned in the baited
hole but with barbs pointing in the wrong direction, these
crows first attempted to use the tool, and then either aban-
doned it or only switched it around after several unsuccess-
ful attempts, even over repeated trials. In the wild, it seems
that their successful use of the barbed leaves comes from
the procedure by which they rip the tool from the leaf and
insert it into the hole [23]. Yet when the same experiment
was run with hooked stick-tools, most of the same crowsimmediately repositioned the tools
before attempting to use them: the
picture is not straightforward.
The fact is that the use of simple
heuristic procedures does not preclude
the capacity for more sophisticated
strategies. Quick and simple strategies
offer evolutionary advantages for
animals in a harsh and competitive
natural environment. Humans can also
use ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics to solve
problems, rather than slow and effortful
reasoning processes, and indeed this
approach is often more efficient [24]:
how many of us have tried a keywithout bothering to check first which way up it needed to
be used? Perhaps the most powerful illustration of the
danger of reliance on negative results comes from a study
in which adult humans were given the trap problem: just
like the tool-using animals, most continued to avoid the in-
verted trap [25]! And indeed, it does no harm to do so.
Although humans would no doubt use more sophisticated
strategies in many of the other situations in which animals
‘fail’, would this reflect a qualitative difference in our cogni-
tivemake-up or a difference in our tendency to employ effort-
ful thought? Are there any contexts in which animals go
beyond simple strategies?
A re-designed trap task, which pitted physical reasoning
against perceptually based strategies, was used with rooks
[26] and chimpanzees [27]. To avoid a trap, in some condi-
tions subjects had to move the food across a plastic surface
to an exit at the side, and in others they had to push it down
an uninterrupted channel to an exit at the bottom. In a critical
contrast, the same feature (the plastic surface) had to be
treated differently depending on whether it played the role
of a supporting surface (when the side exits were open) or
barrier (when they were closed). Most chimpanzees and
rooks did not make this distinction, suggesting reliance on
the surface-level appearance of the task; but one animal
from each group did, apparently having encoded something
about the key physical properties. Chimpanzees (and also
New Caledonian crows) were able to transfer their success
in one trap problem to another one with very different
perceptual features, also implicating abstract representa-
tional capacities [27,28]. Nevertheless, in all of these studies
there is notable individual variation, the cause of which
remains to be investigated.
Capuchin monkeys have also been shown to treat the
same visual feature differently depending on task-relevant
physical properties [29]. Wild capuchins were presented
with stones at some distance from a nut-cracking anvil:
they quickly selected large, heavy, robust stones to trans-
port, seemingly identifying the effective stones through
visual inspection. When presented with novel, man-made
‘stones’, which looked identical but differed in density and
Figure 3. Tool use by crows.
(A) A New Caledonian crow uses a Pandanus
tool. (B) A selection of step-cut Pandanus
tools made by the crows. New Caledonian
crows cut tools from the leaves of Pandanus,
which are edged with a convenient row of
spiny hooks. Themost complex of these tools
are broad at the base and narrow at the distal
end, providing a precision tip without com-
promising tool rigidity. Tapering is achieved
by tearing the tool from the leaf in a step-
wise fashion, with asmany as four steps along
the length of the tool. (Photos: panel A, Mick
Sibley, University of Auckland; panel B, Gavin
Hunt.)
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gently moved the stones before trans-
porting the heavy, effective tool. They
even chose correctly when the heavy
tool was smaller than the other
alternatives.
Insight
If animals do know something about the
physics of their environment and their
actions, can they use this knowledge
productively, to reason about newappli-
cations for tools or new means to reach
their goals? The question of animal
insight dates back to Koehler’s experi-
ments at the beginning of the 20th
century, in which chimpanzees were
given the task of obtaining out-of-reach
rewards. The rapid emergence of
a fully-formed solution, such as stacking
boxes to climb on or combining short
sticks to produce a long tool, prompted
Koehler to apply the term ‘insight’ as an
alternative mechanism to blind trial-
and-error. However, the fact that chim-
panzees exhibit many of these behav-
iours when the objects are presented
without an out-of-reach reward points
towards a simpler explanation: perhaps the ‘spontaneity’ of
the chimpanzees’ solution and its suitability to the task at
hand was a case of one lucky trial and no error [30].
In a recent revival of insight experiments, rooks, normally
a non-tool-using species, were presented with a tube con-
taining a collapsible platform with a food reward resting on
it — the platform would collapse under slight pressure so
that the food would fall out [31]. At first the rooks did not
solve the problem, but after experience of nudging stones
into the tube from a ledge next to the opening they began
to bring stones to drop into it, and generalised their solution
to pushing down on the platformwith sticks. In a subsequent
experiment they even made a hook to lift a bucket of food
from a tube: they put a wire into the tube, bent it over the
lip, reversed the wire and used it to pull up the bucket.
Impressive as this undoubtedly is, in all cases the solution,
as in the rooks’ training, involved adding an object to the
tube; and the items to be used were placed beside it,
increasing the likelihood that the ‘correct’ action would bethe first one attempted in the face of the new problem.
Without another group of naı¨ve birds for each stage, it is
impossible to know how important that cumulative experi-
ence was [30]. Regardless, the rooks displayed sensitivity
to the task requirements, quickly developing a preference
for heavy stones over light ones and using thin stones in pref-
erence to wide ones when the mouth of the tube was nar-
rowed. In the platform-collapsing task, New Caledonian
crows generalised from the experience of pecking at the
platform through a small-necked tube to dropping objects
into it when the neck was longer; though note that these
birds, unlike the rooks, already have tool-use in their behav-
ioural repertoire [32].
In his later writings, Koehler made a distinction between
insight (quickly recognising when the right solution has
been stumbled upon in the course of exploration, leading
to a sudden disappearance of further trial-and-error), and
‘foresight’ (sizing up a problem in advance through physical
reasoning and bringing a new solution to it fully formed). To
Figure 4. A Goualougo chimpanzee with
a brush-tipped tool.
Chimpanzees in theGoualougo Trianglemake
a range of tools when fishing for termites:
they select robust plants for making digging
sticks, stripping side branches and sharp-
ening one end before puncturing a fishing
hole into subterranean termite nests; they
also split stems lengthwise to use as flexible
fishing lines for angry termites to bite onto;
and form brush-tipped twigs by raking the
tip through their teeth, providing a greater
surface area for termite attachment. (Photo:
Ian Nichols.)
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than for the latter in animals such as chimpanzees and cor-
vids. The exact cognitive mechanisms underpinning both
sorts of accomplishment are yet to be formalised, but exam-
ining the sorts of experience needed for the emergence of
such seemingly ‘insightful’ solutions seems to be a fruitful
beginning [30].
A powerful illustration of the role of immediate feedback
about an action’s effect comes from a study investigating
one of the most famous cases for insight in animals: birds
pulling up a reward on the end of a string tied to a perch in
increments, trapping successive lengths under their feet.
Strikingly, most naı¨ve New Caledonian crows produced the
complete solution in one fluid attempt from the first trial.
However, when deprived of visual feedback (through the
use of a horizontal occluder with a hole just large enough
for the reward to pass through), naı¨ve NewCaledonian crows
tugged at the string but did not pull up the reward. Even
the performance of the experienced subjects was disrupted
[33]. This experiment neatly exemplifies how even rapidly
emerging solutions need not have been planned out in the
mind. What role, if any, did physical knowledge play? Visual
feedback was shown to be necessary, but is it sufficient —
would any action with a contingent effect on the reward be
repeated?
Planning
One reason that tools have had such a high profile in the
study of human evolution is the evidence they give about
ancient hominins’ ability to plan ahead. Reconstructions of
knapped flint fromover twomillion years ago show adetailed
sequence of detachments that can only result from mentally
‘looking ahead’ in the manufacture process [34]; later in
human evolution, raw material for stone tools has been
found transported from sites miles away from the point of
manufacture and use [34]; later still, hand axes were retained
for use over long periods of time. Does the evidence from
non-humans suggest any similar kinds of foresight and
planning?
Several authors have suggested that apparent evidence of
anticipatory planning in animals can be explained anotherway. When you take a canvas bag
with you towork in anticipationof a later
shopping trip, this could result from an
imagination of your future-self standing
at the check-out with items to trans-
port. But alternatively it might be that
packing your bag was habitual,triggered by the context of getting ready for work. That habit
might have been shaped by associative learning, and not
reflect any imagination of yourself in the future or memory
of yourself in the past: without the chance to ask, it would
be hard to tell. With this concern in mind, much of the
evidence that suggests anticipatory planning in animals is
ambiguous [35]. We should also note that there is no way
in principle of telling whether non-humans imagine them-
selves personally in the past or projected into the future, as
humans do; all we can do is to discover whether current
behaviour is based on representation of past or future states.
Chimpanzees, New Caledonian crows and capuchin
monkeys are all known to transport their tools over relatively
long distances (roughly 50–200 m). For instance, when
a chimpanzee is seen to bite off several vine or herb stems,
strip off the side leaves, bite the tips neatly and tuck them
into her mouth, observers can be sure she has termite-
fishing in mind, even if no termite mound is in sight. That
might be explained as a learnt habit, triggered by feeling in
the mood for a termite snack. In the laboratory, however,
apes are found to select tools for future use even in cases
that cannot be explained this way. Instead of a tasty grape,
they will select a tool they will need to gain a large reward
in an hour’s time; and yet with the tool in hand they will
reverse their preference and take the grape, instead of the
now-superfluous tool [36].
It has long been noticed that chimpanzees make tools in
advance, where appropriate raw material is not available at
the site of use, sometimes out of sight of the place of use.
A particularly striking case is that of the chimpanzees of
Goualougo, which use two different tools in sequence to
fish for underground termites. First, they puncture the
ground using a digging stick, and then use a flexible tool to
fish. The robust digging stick is usually left at the site, and
so it is the second tool of the sequence that the chimpanzees
often arrive carryingwith them.Apparently they think through
their regular tool-using routine in advance: just as we might
think through a familiar recipe, and remember to soak the
currants a day in advanceof starting cooking. All these exam-
ples could be retrospectively ‘explained’ as the result of
associative learning, but the plausibility of doing so
Figure 5. Woodpecker finch chooses the
correct raking tool.
Interestingly, the relatives of these tool-using
birds, small and large tree finches, solve this
task equally quickly, despite not using tools
in the wild. (Photo: Irmgard Teschke and
Sabine Tebbich.)
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ness of the anticipation increases [37].
Tools and Evolution
Why Has Tool-Use Evolved in Some
Species?
Using tools to get food involves costs:
direct costs of time and effort, and
opportunity costs if simpler-to-access
foods are missed while struggling
with the harder task. Candidates for
environmental features that might
outweigh these costs include: lower
availability of directly accessible foods
compared to ‘defended’ ones; high
nutritional quality of defended foods;
and unpredictability from seasonal variation or rapid envi-
ronmental change, selecting for flexibility in food-getting.
(These candidate features are not mutually exclusive: need
and opportunity can act in combination, and different
features may have acted at different points during the evolu-
tion of a species.)
Some support for these ideas can be found in recent field
studies. For example, Tebbich and Taborsky [38] found that
woodpecker finches prefer to use tools to probe tree holes
for invertebrates, specifically in arid habitats and in the dry
season: then, availability of surface prey is lowbut availability
andnutritional content of embeddedprey remains high. Simi-
larly, capuchin monkeys use stones to dig for high-quality
tubers in arid environments, but have not been reported to
do so in habitats rich in other food sources [39]. But orangu-
tans use tools to access insectsmost oftenwhere the insects
are most abundant, even when other resources are freely
available [40]. More generally, ecological hypotheses remain
untested because of the inherent difficulty of doing so. In
order to assess the relative nutritional value and availability
of competing food sources, animal diet and environmental
distribution of food have to be studied in tandem, at the level
of specific nutrients, over at least a year cycle: that has
seldom been done for tool-using species.
Tools for Thought?
Although tool-use can result from simple strategies, sophis-
ticated ones might have advantages: making tool-use more
selective, flexible, and innovative. The cognition actually
involved in animal tool-use is far frombeingwell-understood,
but there are indications that some animals other than hu-
mans know something about the functionality of their tools,
and can take steps in the present in order to gain a reward
in the future. Could the pressure to exploit resources using
tools have provided the selective pressure for the evolution
of those abilities?
Rates of tool-using and of innovation correlate with rela-
tive brain-size in birds and primates, supporting a causallink; but these correlations do not rule out the alternative,
that selection in some other domain created minds capable
of innovation and tool-use. One important line of evidence
is comparison between pairs of closely related species
which differ in few traits other than tool-use: a systematic
difference across such pairs would point to a role for tools
in cognitive evolution. As yet, there are very little data of
this kind available. So far, there is no evidence that New
Caledonian crows outperform other, non-tool-using corvids
such as rooks on physical tasks; and some of the best
evidence for future planning comes from scrub jays [35],
another non-tool-using corvid. Among the great apes,
some populations of chimpanzees and orangutans are the
only habitual tool-users in the wild; but in tests of physical
reasoning or planning they do not systematically outperform
bonobos and gorillas (for example [41]). In a direct compar-
ison between tool-using woodpecker finches and two
closely related but non-tool-using species of Darwin’s finch,
no differences in physical problem-solving skills were found.
All three species rapidly solved problems such as pulling
an effective rather than an ineffective tool to bring food
within reach (Figure 5) [11].
Why Is Tool-Use So Widespread and Sophisticated
in Humans?
The technology of modern humans remains unique in its
breadth and sophistication. What mental adaptations made
thispossible?Several psychological faculties havebeensug-
gested to have changed since the human and ape lineage
diverged: the representational abilities discussed above,
such as conceiving of the future or abstract physical proper-
ties [42]; executive functioning abilities such as working
memory that allow for information to be held in mind and
manipulated [43]; sensorimotor capabilities that allow for
the coordination of perception and action during complex
behaviour such as stone-knapping [44]; the cognitive skills
and motivations underpinning collaborative culture, which
gives rise to a ratcheting-up of tool complexity [45]. Did one
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of the early hominid niche prompted its evolution? In reality,
these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, and several
effectsmight ramifywith eachother over thecourseof human
evolution. However, a quantitative change in working mem-
ory capacity could facilitate changes in several other abilities,
so it is interesting to note support for this way of thinking
from the developmental and comparative literature.
The theory, inspired by the changes in the types of tools
made by hominids, suggests that greater working memory
size would allow modern humans to hold representations
of multiple states of reality in mind at one time: important
for theory of mind, symbolic thought, analogical reasoning
and planning [43]. Executive control certainly seems to play
a crucial role in limiting the problem-solving abilities of young
children. Two-year-olds fail to locate a ball that is rolled
behind an occluder and stopped by a visible wall which
protrudes above the occluder, yet their failure seems to
have little to do with physical reasoning. They make as
many search errors when the occluder is partly transparent,
and their looking-patterns reveal that they correctly antici-
pate it to stop in front of the wall. Instead, coordinating
perception, attention, knowledge, prediction and action
may overload immature executive resources [46]. Interest-
ingly, adult monkeys make similar search errors to human
toddlers, despite looking longer, like the toddlers do, at
displays that violate physical principles [47]. Adult apes, in
contrast, are more successful [48]. Using a tool may pose
even steeper challenges to executive resources than other
actions, both because of the increase in the number of items
that need to be held in mind, and the intricacy of the action
itself [49]. The majority of chimpanzees and three- to four-
year-old children fail to solve the traditional trap task when
required to use a tool, but successfully move the food
away from the trap if small holes allow them to use their
fingers to move the reward [27]. But five-year-old children
solve the task easily, even when using a tool [50]. Thus, there
is tentative support for the notion of an evolutionary trajec-
tory toward greater executive capacities, mirrored in human
ontogeny, which allowed humans to make ever more
complex tools to solve new problems.
The nature of the cognition underpinning uniquely human
tool-use is still hotly debated, but one thing is clear, under-
standing the cognition underpinning animal tool use is
a critical piece of the puzzle. The more we study tool-use
and manufacture in strikingly large-brained animals such
as chimpanzees, capuchin monkeys and crows, the more it
seems that physical reasoning and planning abilities may
have originated deeper in the phylogenetic record than
previously thought, and perhapsmore than once. But we still
know very little about the exact nature of these representa-
tional capacities, and how they interact with other psycho-
logical abilities such as memory and attention during
problem-solving. Solving these puzzles is as important to
understanding human evolution as studying the tools left
behind by extinct hominids.Acknowledgements
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